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 Abstract 
 The aim of this research is to examine the seemingly opposite 
Legalist outlook of the Qin dynasty against the philosophy of 
Confucianism, and determine the extent to which they have impacted 
the government and society of the People’s Republic of China today. It is 
common in Eastern cultures to blend two seemingly opposite ideas, which 
is partially how this mixture of Legalism and Confucianism works in the 
current government. The Qin dynasty employed the legalist governmental 
philosophy, which allowed one ruler to effectively control all of China. This 
set up the principle of a concentrated government over the vast Chinese 
land that has remained throughout the centuries. Aspects of the Qin 
Dynasty have become ingrained in the culture of China, as evident in 
their government structure and harsh punishment system, which will be 
further examined in this paper. Confucianism has impacted the societal 
makeup of the Chinese culture since the fifth century BCE. Many Chinese 
today identify themselves as “Confucian in public and Daoist in private.” 
This paper examines the effects of Confucianism more in depth on both 
the society and government in China today. The aim of the research is to 
examine how much Legalism and Confucianism have blended together 
to create China today. 
 
It may very well be impossible to analyze the exact reasons why anything is the 
way it is; the blend of events is unpredictable. However, Legalist principles and 
Confucian ideas are prevalent in modern China today. This paper will try to examine 
the fusion of these two seemingly opposite ideas to understand how they make up the 
Chinese government, military, punishment system, the state’s view on religion, and the 
society of China today. It is important to examine these effects because it will give a 
rare insight into why China is the way it is: a large state with over a billion people 
controlled by a strict “communist” government that is pretty effective in its rulings. 
 
Historical Background: Legalism  
 The Qin dynasty gave China its first sense of unity, which has lasted until present 
times; this unity was achieved through the harsh system of Legalism, which ironically 
brought about the downfall of the Qin dynasty but strengthened later Chinese 
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governments. Emperor Shih Huangdi brought the multiple separate Chinese nation-
states together by force and molded them into a single country through 
standardizations. Ever since, China has consistently reverted back to a unified state, 
even after times of periodic disunity. The Legalist system that was required in order to 
achieve this unity is not always looked upon benevolently because it was not a 
benevolent system in the least. In fact, it was a totalitarian government that flourished 
by keeping its people miserable. However, Legalism was significantly strong under Shih 
Huangdi, and after his death the dynasty quickly disintegrated.  Nevertheless, China 
was unified more or less permanently through the methods of a madman, as some 
depict him to be. 
The Qin dynasty owes its existence to Legalism, but so does China as a whole. 
Without Legalism, China very well might not have become united and centralized the 
way it is today. Though the Chinese may hold understandable contempt for Shih 
Huangdi and the Qin dynasty, it is important that they keep his gratitude towards them 
as well. Just like any person embarrassed by his past, China knows that its Legalist origins 
made it into the country it is today. Moreover, Legalist ideas are not strictly found in the 
Qin dynasty, but can be compared to other governments (especially autocratic ones), 
and the ideas seem to have been recycled through many schools of thought and 
governmental structures.  
Legalism is a term for a political governing system in which the government is 
exceedingly strong. The state is put above individual interest and war is the primary 
action of the government. William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom say, “In its earliest 
form, ‘Legalism’ was probably the outgrowth of a need for more rational organization 
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of society and resources so as to strengthen a state against its rivals.”1 This is exactly its 
effect on the state of Qin during the Warring States Period in ancient China. Legalism 
was an autocratic form of governing that focused on punishments and rewards; 
legalists believed that people were incapable of acting civilized without a strong 
government to mold them. These punishments not only were for the criminals; 
sometimes they would also be put upon the leaders in charge of the criminals via 
“collective responsibility,” in an effort to keep everyone in line.2 (from the Guanzi by 
Guan Zhong in Bary, pg. 192). A quote from the Guanzi that perfectly explains this is: 
“When punishments are imposed, they shall not be applied to the guilty person alone. 
When rewards are granted, they shall not be bestowed merely on the person credited 
with the achievement.”3 The implications of this were that it minimized the individual 
and focused on people as units. This was exactly what Legalists wanted. Similar to 
fascism, the “people” in a Legalist state were simply pawns of the government, useless 
unless working to strengthen the state. War was the most important thing, because it 
not only expanded the area to be governed, but it kept the people in line and gave 
the ruler more power.  
According to Dorothy Perkins, “Legalism was one of the four most important 
schools among the ‘Hundred Schools of Thought’ that developed during a period of 
socio-political ferment.”4 The Hundred Schools of Thought was comprised of various 
approaches to running a logical government, in reaction to the Warring States Period 
(explained momentarily). The Hundred Schools of Thought thrived between 551 and 233 
                                                 
1 “Legalists and Militarists," In Sources of Chinese Tradition, compiled by Wm. Theodore De Bary 
and Irene Bloom, 190-91, 2nd ed. Vol. 1. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 190. 
2 W. Allyn Rickett, "The Guanzi," in Sources of Chinese Tradition, compiled by Irene Bloom and 
Wm. Theodore De Bary, 192-93, 2nd ed. Vol. 1. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 192. 
3 Rickett 193. 
4 Dorothy Perkins, Encyclopedia of China, (New York, Rountable Press, 1999), 273. 
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BCE and is responsible for the creation or organization of the following philosophies: 
legalism, Daoism, Confucianism, and Mohism, to name a few. 
Han Fei Tzu (known as the founder of legalism; explained in detail later) 
characterized legalism as having these four attributes: punishments and rewards; 
increased production; taxes for the ruler; and a strong military.5 Yet this must be 
expanded upon, because he did not see legalism in its prime—having died before the 
Qin dynasty. Thus for the purpose of comparing degrees of legalism within a 
government in today’s context, the necessary principles found in a legalist state are as 
follows: a centralized government, an autocratic ruler, one party, the state is more 
important than the individual, warfare is emphasized and used often, secret networks to 
stop potential rebellion, propaganda, strict laws with clear and consistent punishments, 
harsh punishments and rewards for adherence to laws, emphasis on agriculture, no 
government handouts, control through fear, and a dismal outlook on scholars6 and 
human nature. The primary example of a legalist government is the Qin Dynasty under 
Emperor Shih Huangdi between 221 and 201 BCE, which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
Warring States Period 
During the Warring States Period in the Hundred Schools of thought, legalists 
attempted to bring government back to rationality instead of the chaotic mess it was 
under the Zhou dynasty (immediately preceding the Qin dynasty). The Zhou dynasty 
was comprised of many feudal states and occurred between the years 1100 and 256 
                                                 
5 Burton Watson, "Li Si: Legalist Theories in Practice," in Sources of Chinese Tradition, edited by 
Wm. Theodore De Bary and Irene Bloom, 206-12, 2nd ed. Vol. I. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999), 206. 
6 The nations could not be successfully dictated to if intelligent people incessantly pointed out 
faults. 
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BCE. These states’ rulers had freedom to rule as they wished on the stipulation that the 
state gave military support to the Zhou Emperor and declared themselves under his 
rule. It worked well until the states began fighting among themselves for power; they 
each desired power and the rule of the empire. They managed to overtake the 
Emperor, which caused more power struggles. This time is referred to as the Warring 
States Period. This was just as it sounds: the feudal states competed for power in an 
attempt to become the new central ruler of the empire. They eventually reduced 
themselves down to seven states: Qin, Wei, Han, Chu, Qi, Yan, and Zhao. As the wars 
waged, China thrived culturally. This is when the Hundred Schools of Thought emerged. 
Philosophy and intellect prospered in an attempt to make up for the wars 
preoccupying the current heads of states. 
The victor of the Warring States was Prince Cheng, ruler of Qin since 246 BCE. The 
state of Qin was not gentlemanly or sophisticated (according to other Chinese states at 
this time), but it excelled in warfare. The proof of this was in their conquering of the 
other states. It was this barbarianism that allowed Qin to succeed in their wars, because 
they did not necessarily follow the proper war etiquette.7 Qin at this time was a Legalist 
state, which had been strengthened by the leadership of Shang Yang (390-338 BCE), 
who will be discussed later. 
Shih Huangdi and the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty 
Prince Cheng established the empire of Qin in 221 BCE. He named himself Qin 
Shih Huangdi (literally: First Sovereign Emperor). He took this name from the legendary 
Yellow Emperor of China (Huangdi). The Yellow Emperor (circa 2696–2598 BCE) 
allegedly unified China commissioned many improvements to daily life. The Yellow 
                                                 
7 Empires ascendant: time frame 400 BC-AD 200, (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1987), 140. 
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Emperor also allegedly knew secrets on alchemy and immortality, and went to heaven 
as an immortal. This idea of immortal life fascinated Emperor Shih Huangdi, and 
became one of his obsessions. Qin Shih Huangdi tied himself to this successful ruler of 
Chinese past as a way of legitimizing his rule and increasing his popularity. He also did 
this to attach himself to the immortality of the Yellow Emperor, hoping he could achieve 
it as well:  
Legends claim that after the Yellow Emperor organized his kingdom, he 
ascended into the sky as an immortal being. King Zheng [Cheng] of Qin… 
gave himself the title Qin Shi Huangdi… to associate himself with the 
supernatural powers attributed to Huangdi. He built himself a splendid 
mausoleum at Mount Li in anticipation of joining the band of immortals 
after he died on Earth.8 
Shih Huangdi focused on tying himself to immortality via links to past times of prosperity 
to improve his reputation.  
C.P. Fitzgerald says that “the Ch’in-Han revolution was the most profound and 
far-reaching social upheaval in all Chinese history.”9 Though this is a strong statement, it 
is based on a solid fact: the establishment of the Qin Dynasty destroyed the long-
standing feudalist states through a revolution from the top, put in place by Shih Huangdi 
and his advisors. Shih Huangdi used specific methods to achieve this unity. He had 
former kingdoms’ walls torn down to assert uniformity and he collected all weapons 
from individuals. He had these weapons melted and made into statues and bells. 
Twelve statues from this metal were displayed in the new capital city of Xianyang. In 
addition, Shih Huangdi made it illegal to own weapons for personal use. Many did not 
like this, but it prevented an armed revolution on the new government. Moreover, Shih 
Huangdi redistributed the territories. There were now a total of thirty-six regions called 
“commanderies.” With the Emperor’s expansionism, the commanderies eventually 
                                                 
8 Perkins, 600-601. 
9 C.P. Fitzgerald, China: a Short Cultural History, (USA, Westview Press: 1985), 137. 
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increased to forty-eight. Over time, he acquired the Ordos region, South China, 
Vietnam, and Fukien.  
The aristocracies and families of the old kingdoms were brought to the capital to 
be distracted and isolated from their former kingdoms. The former rulers were given the 
collective name “Sons of Heaven” and were in charge of sacrifices to Heaven. In the 
place of the former aristocrats in China, new, intelligent men from the middle class were 
put in charge of the commanderies. This idea of meritocracy that Shih Huangdi initiated 
assured that the new officials would be faithful to him and his government. They owed 
Shih Huangdi their success because he chose them for their intelligence and gave 
them their status. This meritocracy became a common theme in China as the years 
and dynasties progressed.  
 The new Qin government not only abolished the old feudal kingdoms, it 
strengthened the Emperor’s power through centralization. The new arrangement is 
described as such: 
 The emperor’s top deputies were his chancellor or prime minister, the 
military commander in chief, and a ‘grandee secretary,’ who oversaw the 
performance of government officials. Below these was a cabinet of nine 
ministers with jurisdiction in areas such as justice, ceremonial rites, and the 
treasury.10 
Shih Huangdi kept his chief advisor Li Si (a legalist) as such when he took the title of 
Emperor. Shih Huangdi and his advisors decided to transfer the old legalist principles of 
the state of Qin to the new dynasty of Qin, simply by expanding the laws and practices 
to every part of the empire. The Emperor had high hopes for his legalist government; he 
thought it would last “ten thousand ages.”11 Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending 
on your point of view), the empire only lasted fifteen years. The Qin dynasty died with 
                                                 
10 Timeframe 141. 
11 Fitzgerald 138. 
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Shih Huangdi; it was not the same after the First Emperor was no longer in power, but 
this will be elaborated upon in due time.  
Shih Huangdi: His Life and his Obsessions 
Shih Huangdi was a peculiar man partial to obsessions. According to Timeframe, 
“Everything about him, his fears and hatreds as well as his plans and visions, was 
exaggerated, magnified beyond human scale.”12 However, the sources on Shih 
Huangdi which portray him this way were by Han historians, who were Confucian; their 
values as Confucian required them to look upon legalism with disdain. Thus the Han 
critics may have been harsh towards Shih Huangdi in description because of their 
hatred for his policies. Just as likely, though, Shih Huangdi was every bit as crazy and 
ruthless as he is made out to be. His mother was a courtesan and his father may have 
been Lu Buwei, a court advisor for the state of Qin. Regardless, when Prince Cheng was 
13 he became King Cheng of Qin. Until he was 21, Lu Buwei and his mother were 
regents. His paranoia started early on in his reign: he had Lu Buwei sentenced to death 
because of a supposed plot against him. Shih Huangdi then appointed Li Si as his 
advisor, or Chancellor of the Left.  
Shih Huangdi was a cruel ruler; he took his Legalist principles to the extreme and 
enforced harsh, disproportional punishments for violators of his laws. He recruited 
people to be hard laborers and soldiers, utilizing them without thought or care. A failed 
assassination attempt in 227 BCE had deepened Shih Huangdi’s already prevalent 
paranoia, pushing him further to his search for immortality. Shih Huangdi slept in a 
different room each night and promised death to any who told of his current 
whereabouts. 
                                                 
12 Timeframe 142. 
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In his search for immortality, Shih Huangdi became entranced with Daoism, 
despite his distaste for religions. However, Daoism was originally intended to reconnect 
with one’s own nature, which was one of many conflicting beliefs between Shih 
Huangdi’s Legalist principles and his affinity for Daoism. One example of the conflicting 
interests between the two was that Legalism requires a strong government, while 
Daoism prefers a minimalist one. Daoist rulers are supposed to not seem like rulers at all 
and leave things up to the people. So, Shih Huangdi disregarded the parts of Daoism 
that did not correlate with his Legalist policies and instead focused on the immortality 
aspects of the religion. Daoists practiced alchemy—which they said would lead to 
immortal life through eating certain herbs and minerals (such as sulfur). In an effort to 
pursue this, Shih Huangdi made trips around his empire in search of immortality; for 
example, he was the first ruler who climbed Mount Tai—a sacred mountain—to make 
sacrifices to become immortal. He traveled to the East coast many times in search of 
the elixir of life, stopping in villages along the way to strengthen his power. He met with 
the local governments and took part in religious sacrifices to “reconnect” with the 
people.  
There were Eight Immortals in Daoism at Shih Huangdi’s time, who supposedly 
acquired the title from being good, sacrificing, and meditating. How Shih Huangdi 
expected to achieve immortality through Daoism is open to interpretation, because he 
certainly did not perform good deeds in terms of his governing decisions. However, in 
search of these immortals, Shih Huangdi is said to have sent some of the first settlers to 
Japan (according to legend). He gave permission to a large group of magicians to 
travel to the Penglai Islands, supposedly the home of the Daoist Immortals. The 
magicians required hundreds of men and women to accompany them, so Shih 
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Huangdi sent them along. He never saw them again, so he never knew if they found 
the elixir of life or not. Perhaps they feared his wrath if they did not find such elixir. 
Supposedly, this is how Japan first became colonized. 
Shih Huangdi’s paranoia reached its peak in 211 BCE. Unlike Julius Caesar, Shih 
Huangdi took the ill omens he encountered and heard about to heart and set out once 
more to find immortality. He went with a number of companions, including Li Si and 
many of his eunuchs and concubines. On the trip, Shih Huangdi became deathly ill, so 
wrote a letter to his son Fu Su asking him to be his heir again. That letter never reached 
Fu Su. 
Fall of the Dynasty 
The Qin dynasty fell as quickly as it rose. Li Si and the powerful royal eunuch 
Chao Kao kept the letter Shih Huangdi wrote to Fu Su and let Shih Huangdi perish on 
board the ship. They told no one of the Emperor’s death, and wrote a new letter to Fu 
Su from “Shih Huangdi” asking him to kill himself, to which Fu Su complied. They did this 
in order to prevent Fu Su from having them executed when he came to power. When 
the ship reached shore again, Li Si and Chao Kao had a fish cart follow the Emperor’s 
cabin to hide the stench of his decaying corpse. They were then able to secure Shih 
Huangdi’s weak son Huhai to be the next Emperor, Er Qin Shih Huangdi (Second 
emperor of the Qin dynasty). Within the next four years, Er Shih Huangdi, Zhao Gao, and 
Li Si had undone the former Emperor’s work—though Er Shih Huangdi was merely a 
puppet in the advisors’ decisions. In 208 BCE, Zhao Gao arranged for Li Si’s execution by 
way of being split in two at his waist. Zhao Gao and Er Shih Huangdi then arranged the 
murders of other children of Shih Huangdi. Zhao Gao then convinced Huhai to commit 
suicide and he put another relative, Zi Ying, on the throne to be the King (not Emperor). 
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The new king then sentenced Zhao Gao to death, but the damage was done. During Er 
Shih Huangdi’s “reign,” uprisings had spread throughout China around 209 BCE, led by 
a rebel named Ch’en She. Descendents of former feudal kings were put in charge of 
their former states and in 207 BCE—forty-six days after being King—Zi Ying was forced to 
surrender to the rebel Liu Bang, who was to form the Han dynasty. 
Territory was given to those who had fought during the rebellions, but the newly 
restored feudal system did not last long. Fitzgerald declares that this is the best example 
of how thoroughly the Qin dynasty destroyed the feudal system, because even though 
it had a brand new chance to reassert itself, the feudal system failed quickly. Fitzgerald 
explains that Qin “was destroyed, divided and humbled. No better opportunity could 
be asked for; if the feudal system was the true solution for the troubles of the state, it 
had now a fresh lease of life, but it collapsed at once.”13 This is the first proof of the 
permanent unity of China. 
The rapid deterioration of the Qin dynasty was in part because of Shih Huangdi’s 
personality. He was paranoid, secretive, and cruel; this led to his unpopularity and 
Huhai’s easy controllability, since Li Si and Chao Gao were two of the few who knew 
how Shih Huangdi ruled the empire (or so they thought). Shih Huangdi also burned 
books and proclaimed himself a divinity, which contributed to his popular dislike. When 
Chao Kao was in power, his paranoia also pulled the empire down; his paranoia of 
assassination led to his dismissal of many good generals he feared would rise against 
him, and to the execution of Li Si. Chao Kao also gave more taxes and enforced 
harsher laws, which led to more exiles and convicts. The instability of the time added to 
the disintegration of the dynasty. Moreover, those in the government were all afraid 
                                                 
13 Fitzgerald 152. 
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and distrustful of each other, so none tried to fix the Legalist system. Thus the system 
imploded on itself; the fear meant for the people extended to the officials, leading Shih 
Huangdi to be the only one who could have reformed the government. Thus, the only 
way out was a revolt because officials were too afraid for their lives to attempt to make 
changes. They did not know whom they could trust.  
As stated before, the Han dynasty, established after the Qin, did not like Shih 
Huangdi or his legalism. Their reports may be exaggerated, but Chia I (a Han historian) 
wrote The Faults of Qin, which outlined the supposed causes of the downfall of the 
dynasty. It declared that Shih Huangdi was greedy, untrustworthy, and increased 
punishments and tortures in the empire. Chia wrote, “When a man has the rank of Son 
of Heaven, and all the wealth of the empire as his riches, and yet cannot escape being 
massacred, it is because he has failed to distinguish between the means by which 
power is safeguarded and the causes which lead to disaster.”14 The people did not like 
the constant warfare, conscription of laborers, and extreme measures that Shih 
Huangdi took to minimize criticism of his mode for governing.  
Standardizations 
Shih Huangdi standardized currency, weight and lengths, laws, taxes, and script. 
His coins were to be used throughout the empire; they were round and copper with a 
hole in the middle for easy carrying (they could be strung together). Weight and length 
units were standardized in order to improve trade both between commanderies and to 
outsiders. Unifying the laws and taxes further cemented the idea of a united Chinese 
Empire because they were all treated the same way. They were treated poorly and 
severely, but they were treated the same no matter what. One of the most remarkable 
                                                 
14 Fitzgerald 150. 
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and important standardizations, though, was the standardization of writing. Dialects 
throughout the empire were different, but the characters were identical. This not only 
helped with trade, laws, and communication in general, but it is still a unifying factor of 
China today. Current Chinese scholars are able to read Qin documents, and 
documents of later times, because of this standardization. If Shih Huangdi had allowed 
different commanderies to maintain their individual writing, his firm grasp of the empire 
would not have been achieved. Communication would have been a defeating 
obstacle; he would have had to translate his laws and declarations to each different 
language, which was not what his empire or Legalism was about. His people were 
supposed to accommodate to him, not the other way around. 
Shih Huangdi on the Past and Religion 
As mentioned, though Shih Huangdi liked the alchemical part of Daoism, he 
distrusted religions in general. This is in part due to Legalism’s focus on the here and now 
with a disdain to the past. Shih Huangdi disregarded the past because he did not want 
to be compared to it.15  
In 213 B.C. some scholars and officials attempted to persuade [Shih 
Huangdi] to decentralize some of his power by allowing feudal states to 
have a degree of autonomy. Li Si, speaking for the emperor, replied that 
scholars who study the past to criticize the present created only chaos. He 
drew up an order from Emperor Qin Shi Huangdi that all books except 
those written about practical topics such as agriculture, medicine, and 
divination were to be burned.16 
Anyone who disagreed with this Book Burning was to be buried alive. The emperor’s 
own son, Fu Su—first heir to the Emperor—was exiled because he opposed the book 
burning. In 212 BCE Shih Huangdi put 460 scholars to death because he “thought” they 
were plotting against him—though perhaps they were merely reading and discussing 
                                                 
15 However, he did want to be associated with the Yellow Emperor. It is funny how people pick 
and choose things. 
16 Perkins 408. 
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books Shih Huangdi did not want them to look at. Shih Huangdi burned books in an 
effort to minimize criticism about his government, but it actually made them criticize 
and hate him even more. Some brave souls successfully saved a few copies of ancient 
texts (especially those on Confucius), but for the most part, our knowledge of ancient 
China today is limited because of the lack of texts from the Book Burning. 
Legacy of the Qin dynasty 
The Qin dynasty was a time of a strong, harsh tyranny, but its impact on China 
was unprecedented. It united China in a way that it had yet to see, which was due to 
its legalist system of government. This sense of unity was furthered by standardizations 
employed throughout the empire. Most importantly, the Legalist philosophy employed 
by the government allowed for one ruler to effectively control all of China, which set up 
the principle of a concentrated government over the vast Chinese land that is still in use 
today. Present day China has a love/hate attitude towards Shih Huangdi; they think he 
was a cruel leader who destroyed access to their history from his book burning, but they 
appreciate what he contributed towards China culturally. Shih Huangdi’s focus on 
meritocracy also led to the establishment of a new class of educated elite known as 
chun tzu (which had formerly been the aristocracy). Overall, “Shih Huang Ti has earned 
the detestation of all succeeding generations of Chinese scholars for his burning of the 
books and his contempt for the past, but their denunciations have not availed to 
destroy his true monument, the ideal of a unified empire, which he left as a legacy to all 
succeeding dynasties.”17  
Shang Yang and Han Fei Zi 
The person attributed with the enacting of Legalism in the state of Qin is Shang 
                                                 
17 Fitzgerald 138. 
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Yang (Lord Shang); his major work is The Book of Lord Shang. Lord Shang was a prime 
minister who strengthened Qin with his legalist policies in the mid-300s BCE. Shang Yang 
had been born and raised in Wei, next to Qin, but was not appointed Prime Minister 
even though he had worked for the previous one and had been recommended.18 This 
led him to accept a position for King Xiao of Qin in 356 BCE. This proved a good step for 
Qin and a poorly-thought decision by Wei. Shang Yang’s reforms to Qin were far-
reaching and long-lasting: 
As prime minister, Shang Yang built up Qin into a powerful military 
machine following the principles of the Legalist School of Thought. He 
centralized the administration of the counties within the state and divided 
the population into groups of families that had to provide prescribed 
numbers of young men to serve in the army. He attracted immigrants from 
other states by raising the status of peasants through such policies as 
allowing them to buy and sell land.19 
This was, more or less, a rubric as to how Shih Huangdi would set up his empire. Both 
Shang Yang and Shih Huangdi were harsh with their punishments, but they did provide 
rewards to promote good behavior. Shang Yang similarly had two Confucian 
documents burned (Book of Songs and Book of History), which shows the dislike of 
religion and the past even at this early stage of Legalist development. Shang Yang was 
killed after King Xiao passed away. His successors had taken parts of Wei and all of Shu 
by 316 BCE because of the foundation built by Shang Yang. 
If Shang Yang was known for practicing Legalism, Han Fei Zi is remembered as 
having recorded it. Han Fei Zi was born in Han and wanted to make Han into a strong 
military power. The Han government did not listen to Han Fei Zi, so he recorded his 
views, which laid out the principles of Legalism. One of his most important works was the 
                                                 
18 Perkins 448. 
19 Ibid. 448. 
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book Han Feizi20. It focuses on shi (power), fa (law), and xing ming (performance and 
title).When Han Fei Zi was sent to Qin by his government in 233 BCE, he did not return; 
he was offered a position in Qin and accepted. Qin leaders seemed to be able to 
know who the state would benefit the most from, and had no problem if they were not 
a native to Qin. This is significant because during the Qin dynasty, this absence of 
discrimination allowed the dynasty to thrive instead of being torn apart by racism.  
Abolition of Aristocracy and Centralization of Power 
One of Li Si’s polices that Shih Huangdi enacted was the previously mentioned 
abolition of feudalism. “The entire area of China was brought under the direct control 
of the central court through an administrative system of prefectures and counties.”21 
Shih Huangdi did not want any feudal kingdoms or aristocrats taking power from him, so 
brought them close to him so he could keep an eye on them. To secure the 
abolishment of feudalism, Shih Huangdi and Li Si enacted various standardizations 
already discussed in this paper. Li Si praised Shih Huangdi for all his harsh actions: “Now 
Your Majesty is the first to accomplish a great achievement. He has founded a glory 
which will endure for ten thousand ages. This is what narrow scholars cannot 
understand.”22 
The organization of the state in Legalism is specific. Legalism focuses on 
maximizing the state’s efficiency and giving as much power as possible to the 
concentrated government, which has already been discussed. The Emperor was in 
charge completely and resolutely, and used military might to defeat any who dared to 
say differently. The laws that the government enacted had to be strict and clear so that 
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the unintelligent subjects could easily understand them. They needed predictability with 
dire consequences to train the people into lawfulness.  
Attitude to Education, Scholarship, the Past, and Religion 
Education and scholarship was a waste of time because it did not help with the 
state’s power. Legalism did not care about intellect, only power. Talking about nothing 
was not efficient, thus there was no place for it in the Legalist doctrine. Han Feizi said 
that “men of literacy accomplishment should not be employed in the government, for 
to employ them is to bring confusion to the law.”23 By this he means that their debate 
about the interpretation of laws only leads to the confusion of the people. This is why all 
laws must be simple, clear, and always upheld, no matter what the perpetrator’s rank 
or job. Also, Legalists did not want scholars criticizing their methods, especially by 
comparing it to past governments. The Legalists advocated for a straightforward 
formula towards the “justice” system that would apply to everyone regardless of rank. 
Similarly, Han Feizi says that “the enlightened ruler works with facts and discards useless 
theories. He does not talk about deeds of humaneness and rightness, and he does not 
listen to the words of scholars.”24 A Legalist ruler should not care about morals, only 
about laws. 
In Han Feizi there is a story of a rabbit that trips on a stump. The farmer who owns 
the land and finds the rabbit wants to kill more rabbits this way, so sits there and waits. 
However, no more rabbits come, so the farmer looks like a fool and the town makes fun 
of him. Han Feizi says that this is what governments that focus on the past do; they are 
stumpwatchers because they waste their time on something that will not work again.25 
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Han Feizi also makes it his responsibility to point out flaws he sees in other forms of 
government, especially by citing that Confucians and Mohists praised the ancient times 
when rulers and subjects had a father-son relationship. Han Feizi points out:  
But though all parents may show love for their children, the children are 
not always well behaved…. And if such love cannot prevent children from 
becoming unruly, then how can it bring the people to order?... 
Humaneness may make one shed tears and be reluctant to apply 
penalties, but law makes it clear that such penalties must be applied.26 
He thus explains one of the weaknesses of the Confucian and Mohist governments. Han 
Feizi goes on to say that love of parents is not enough to scare children into behaving; 
they will not behave until the army is set upon them. He says that “people by nature 
grow proud on love, but they listen to authority.”27 This dismisses Confucianism because 
of its nature of focusing on love.28 Fei Zi maintains that if love is praised by the 
government then the military is automatically condemned. Since the military is a 
necessary part of Legalism, love could not be included. 
Legalists do not like religion because of its loose interpretations. Religions can 
come from the same prophet but are practiced different ways, which does not give a 
clear answer as to who is right. Legalists like things that are straightforward and easy to 
interpret, so they understandably take issue with religions. In Han Feizi, Han Feizi says 
that “Confucius and Mozi both followed the ways of Yao and Shun, and though their 
practices differed, each claimed to be following the real Yao and Shun. But since we 
cannot call Yao and Shun back to life, who is to decide whether it is the Confucians or 
the Mohists who are telling the truth?”29 Since there is no proof as to who is correct, 
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those that follow religions are idiots because they believe things without question.30 
Legalists believe that this will lead to chaos. 
Moreover, Legalism despises Confucianism. Han Feizi says “When the Confucians 
of the present time counsel rules, they do not praise those measures that will bring order 
today, but talk only of the achievements of the men who brought order in the past.”31 
He condemns them for staying in the past and not working on the efficiency of the 
present. Confucius believed that people can be taught morals, which was opposite to 
the fundamental belief of Legalism that they cannot.  
Historical Background: Confucianism 
 Confucianism is a popular social philosophy around the world, based on the 
teachings of Kong Fuzi, otherwise known as Confucius (551-479 BCE). He believed there 
was a natural universal order and that humans simply needed to listen to it. One of the 
values he stressed was xioa, or filial piety. Respect for your superiors was important to 
him, whether it be child/parent, wife/husband, or student/teacher. Another value 
Confucius taught was ren, or humaneness; for Confucians, one must be considerate 
and loving to everyone. This extends to the relationship between a ruler and his/her 
subjects: rulers should rule through virtue. One more main value was junzi, which can be 
translated to the “cultivated man.” Cultivation was the key to improving society, 
regardless of socio-economic class. Education, Confucius believed, was the meaning 
of life. Yet this does not have to be intellectual education, but at least an education in 
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morality. Finally, li, or ritual, was vital in leading a good life in Confucian terms. 32 
 The primary Confucian document is the Analects. It stresses the aforementioned 
values, as well as laying out guidelines for a simple daily life. Moreover, because of ren, 
business should be conducted honestly, rather than profitable. Finally, when asked 
about spiritual beings, “The Master said, ‘Before you have learned to serve human 
beings, how can you serve spirits?’ ‘I venture to ask about death.’ ‘When you do not 
yet know life, how can you know about death?’”33 This exemplifies Confucius’ focus on 
the present day and present concerns, not about the after-life.  
 From this explanation of Confucianism, it follows that Confucianism can be 
characterized by the following: filial piety (or respect in general), an attitude of love 
towards others, self-cultivation, ritual, and honesty. It is also important to note how 
Confucianism contrasts with Legalism, and the intense dislike each has for the other.  
Han dynasty 
The Han dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE) following the Qin was a time of imperial 
expansion; it gained control of the Silk Road, which helped China become a dominant 
power in the world economy—which is true today as well. The founders of the Han 
dynasty “knew firsthand the suffering that its [the Qin’s] harsh rule had brought to the 
people… Under their leadership the new regime of the Han was marked by plebeian 
heartiness and vigor, simplicity and frugality in government, and abhorrence of the 
Legalist doctrines of the hated Qin.”34 Its government was originally set up based on 
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Confucian ideas, but reached a point of rebellion. The Confucian idea of love and 
respect was not enough to keep the empire under control. This forced a reformation of 
the government, and legalist principles were snuck into the new structure. Charles O. 
Hucker says that, “some thinkers began to revive Legalist arguments for strong laws, 
strict enforcement, and harsh punishments. Thus Ts’ui Shih (c. 110-70), in his treatise 
Cheng-lun (On Governance), combined lip-service to Confucianism with thoroughly 
Legalist arguments.”35 Ts’ui Shih says that punishment must be applied in order for the 
country to prosper by comparing punishments to remedies for a sickly body and love as 
nourishment. He says that nourishment (love and virtue) would not help the person get 
better, but remedies (punishment) would. Similarly, a healthy person needs nourishment, 
not medicines.36 
After the restructuring of the government, the Han dynasty was quite stable, and 
later dynasties looked to it as an example. Though the government was in many ways 
Legalist, the military was not a big part of this dynasty. The thriving Silk Road spread 
Chinese influence around the world, even though Confucians shied away from 
merchants. Their technology also took off. Some examples were paper, compasses, 
rudders, sea drills and blood pumps. The Han dynasty was tolerant of many diverse 
religions as well. 
Modern China: A Closer Look  
The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 under the leadership of 
Mao Zedong. It has evolved over the years from an idealized, socialist, dictatorship into 
a pragmatic, quasi-socialist system run by a few members of its party. Its official party is 
known as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and is currently headed by General 
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Secretary Hu Jintao and President Premier Wen Jiabao. The Party is the government, 
with only a minor area for complaints. The Party claims it is a democracy, with four levels 
of representative congresses: towns, counties, provinces, and the National Party 
Congress (NPC). Each smaller level is supposed to elect the congress above it, with the 
people at the bottom electing those to their representative districts. However, in 
practice the opposite is the case. The NPC-members actually choose everyone else, 
and the democratic “elections” are predetermined by those in power. The NPC meets 
once a year and consists of roughly 3000 representatives. They are “elected” every 5 
years.  
The CCP’s structure is known as democratic centralism, based on the idea by 
Vladimir Lenin. This means that debate is encouraged within the party, but once a 
decision is made, the entire party must remain united on the issue. According to Alan 
Hunter and John Sexton, however, “the centralism was stressed far more than the 
democracy.”37 This simply refers to how the “elections” are not free and fair, and the 
party can do what it wants. Interestingly enough, China’s military considers itself loyal to 
the CCP and not the state of China. Yet unlike the Mao era of communism, the party 
takes a pragmatic approach to governing, thanks to Deng Xiaoping—who essentially 
took over after the death of Mao. The Party now focuses on making the government 
efficient, instead of turning their leader into a god, like under Mao. 
I keep saying that the Party has control, but in reality, only a few within the Party 
run China. Hunter and Sexton point out: “Real power is in the hands of those individuals 
who sit on a small number of key Party bodies. The main policy-making body for the 
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whole of China is the Standing Committee of the Politiburo.”38 This Committee is in 
charge of policies; its Secretariat controls the daily goings-on. The Military Affairs 
Commission also holds much power—especially in the economy, which will be 
discussed momentarily. The position of greatest power, though, is theoretically the 
General Secretary.  
Economy 
China has what is called a Socialist Market Economy, which is a hybrid of 
socialism and capitalism. Hunter and Sexton say, “Over the last twenty years China has 
moved from a centrally planned economy under an ideology-driven regime to a 
dynamic market economy with a political leadership largely made up of 
technocrats.”39 Part of this change was due to the aforementioned Deng Xiaoping. He 
criticized the fact that people accepted Mao’s word on everything; Deng’s slogan was 
“seek truth from facts.”40 He wanted the government to be pragmatic and not based 
on one person’s individual and undisclosed reason. His advice was heeded, and 
“towards the end of 1977 the media began to carry articles on the subjects of science, 
democracy and the personality cult.”41 People were eventually allowed to own private 
property, and private world trade was advocated. Marxism no longer has a huge role 
in everyday life or in governmental policies. Deng’s efforts opened the economy and 
helped it flourish through exportation. However, this is specifically for the state of China 
as a whole; domestically, China has a wide range between the rich and poor. Those 
who are poor are extremely poor, especially compared to poverty in the US.  
Analysis 
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China has in many respects remained consistent with its roots—whether in 
respect to its people’s respect for traditions and the past, its four levels of government 
(which existed both in ancient times and today, with its provinces remaining in roughly 
the same areas),42 or its centralized rule. But to what extent has China fused its roots of 
Legalism and Confucianism into its makeup today? And what can we learn from this 
answer?  
Government: Centralized Autocracy? 
Legalism requires a centralized dictator, which the PRC today does not have. In 
the PRC today there is less of an emphasis on an autocratic ruler and more on an 
autocratic party. Sure, one person has most power, but the party is not reliant on that 
one person. For instance, when Deng died, there was a smooth transition into the next 
frontrunner. Thus the party is stronger than the individual in charge—who until the 1990s 
did not necessarily have to be formally elected to an office. Deng, for one, had no 
official position, but was able to significantly affect policies. Though this was not the 
case under Mao (there was a power struggle after his death—just like after Shih 
Huangdi), over the years the CCP has grown stronger. Under Legalism, however, the 
person with the most power has an actual position; in Shih Huangdi’s case, it was 
Emperor. Similarly, according to the Analects, official position is important: “If you don't 
have the official position, you can't plan the affairs of government.”43 Thus according to 
the literal interpretation of the primary Confucian document as well as the main 
principle of Legalism, Deng should not have been able to have as much power as he 
did.  
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Hunter and Sexton argue that the CCP is not autocratic, though: “China’s 
political system has been described as totalitarian, but this is not an adequate 
characterization of its practical operation. Divisions within the leadership have often 
created space for the expression of popular resistance to Party policies.”44 Thus they 
believe that the inherent weakness of allowing the Party to dominate allow for divisions, 
which lead to citizens being allowed to protest. Hunter and Sexton cite a demonstration 
(1976) and a democracy movement (1979), as well as the influence of local 
governments. However, few totalitarians have absolute influence over every aspect of 
their citizens’ lives; there will usually be a breakdown somewhere. The fact remains that 
the CCP does not just control the government: it controls the media, internet, 
education, economy, and military (to name a few). Hunter and Sexton themselves 
point out that “There are party branches in almost all institutions, including factories, 
offices, shops, schools, colleges and army units.”45 The extent of this influence implies an 
autocratic nature. The fact that the CCP allows for some demonstrations or protests 
merely implies that they either did not think the fight was worth the trouble, that they 
did not think it was harmful to their rule, or—of course—that they knew they could not 
win the battle. To discredit the examples Hunter and Sexton offer, there is the obvious 
example of Tiananmen Square in 1989. The Premier Li Ping could not tolerate the 
protests, therefore the violence began. 
Regardless, there is no doubt that the government is centralized—which is a 
main point in Legalism. This is evidenced by the aforementioned fact that the NPC 
chooses the rest of the power-holders, and that all the provinces and regions within 
them must report to the NCP and the national Party. Additionally, both the PRC and the 
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Qin dynasty were secretive in their policy making, not allowing those outside the few to 
understand how things came about. But how does Confucianism play a role, and if so, 
to what extent? In contrast to Legalism, Confucianism pushes for a government based 
on respect and trust. It requires that the government rules justly.46 Confucius says that 
“When the government is just, you may speak boldly and act boldly; when you have an 
unjust government, you may act boldly, but be careful of what you say.”47 Sometimes 
the Chinese government allows people to speak out publicly, but often it does not. It 
must be assumed that the CCP believes it is acting in its best interests, but do the 
members believe they are acting in the best interest of the country? It would be 
impossible to get a concrete answer to this question, since there is more than one 
person involved, but the official answer is likely “yes.” Yet is this because of 
Confucianism? This is even harder to answer. Thus other aspects of government in 
Confucianism must be examined.  
The Analects says that “When the Way prevails in the realm, the common 
people do not debate politics among themselves.”48 There is no denying that in China 
today there are many people who do in fact discuss current predicaments at least 
occasionally; so either their government is unjust or they do not adhere to Confucian 
principles. Perhaps one of the reasons there is not a full-scale revolution (if the Chinese 
believe their government is not just) is because of another Confucian principle that says 
that by “being a good son and friendly to ones brothers and sisters you can have an 
effect on government”—this is an important idea because it implies that democracy is 
not needed, because people can help the government just by being a good 
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Confucian. In 12:11, he says that each person should stick to his own role and allow 
others to carry out their position. However, 15:7 says that those who believe the 
government is unjust should keep their positions to themselves in order to be 
“gentlemanly.” Of course, these lines are based on the literal interpretations of a non-
Confucian, so perhaps I am missing a bigger picture. 
According to 6:8, those in government should be efficient, talented, and 
intelligent49—13:2 adds virtuous.50 Moreover, they should provide adequate food, 
weapons, and instill confidence in the people towards their work.51 Confucius goes on 
to say that “From ancient times, death has come to all men, but a people without 
confidence in its rulers will not stand.”52 Perhaps this is part of the reason that the CCP 
chooses when to suppress its people and when not to, in order to keep enough 
confidence in the people to allow the government to stand. The Analects also says a 
few times that if the government runs correctly, others will flock to it.53 Perhaps this is the 
goal of the CCP. 
So has the government been molded by Legalism, Confucianism, both, or 
neither? What does this say about China today? There seems to be undeniable 
relationships between the three in respect to the current government, but it is hard to 
distinguish if this is because it is merely being looked for. It is likely that because of the 
continuation of Legalism from the Qin dynasty into the Han dynasty, the centralized rule 
today was influenced by Legalism. The Qin dynasty had such an impact on the future 
dynasties, thus after the fall of the Qing dynasty, Mao must have gained confidence 
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that his totalitarian system would work because of the centralized government from two 
millennia before. Moreover, because of the strong ties that Chinese have to the past—
and because Confucianism has been so important for the past 2500 years—it is likely 
that Confucianism has played a role in the current government. All three advocate for 
the government to be run by the government and to put the interests of the state 
above those of the individual.  
Military: An Economic Genius? 
 Confucian doctrine is for peace: many of the lines in the Analects mention war in 
a derogatory way. One example is in 7:13, which mentions that “The things with which 
the Master was cautious, were fasting, war and sickness.”54 Thus one can interpret this 
as hesitancy on part of Confucius towards war. Confucius also mentions that “In doing 
government, what is the need of killing? If you desire good, the people will be good. 
The nature of the Gentleman is like the wind, the nature of the inferior man is like the 
grass. When the wind blows over the grass, it always bends.”55 This quote refers to 
violence against one’s own people, but can be extended to war as well. Since he 
mentions repeatedly that others will flock to a Confucian government, it is arguable 
that violence is not needed towards other states because they will eventually admire it. 
Legalism, on the other hand, has a clear-cut definition on war and the military: use it. As 
mentioned, war strengthens the emperor, expands the state, and keeps the people in 
line. It is a vital part of the Legalist system; without it, the emperor could not enforce his 
will. 
 Today, the PRC’s economy is effectively run by the military. Hunter and Sexton 
explain: “The PLA has moved aggressively into business over the past decade. Officially, 
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the purpose of the army’s commercial activities is to relieve pressure on the state’s 
defence [sic] budget, by making the military partly self-financing. But what began as a 
limited form of self-sufficiency has grown into a multi-billion dollar business that some 
believe is threatening the military effectiveness of China’s armed forces.”56 Moreover, 
many of those in power in the CCP were military figures: Mao, Deng, and Lin Biao57—just 
like Shih Huangdi. However, China’s foreign policy must be taken into account. The PRC 
does not constantly invade other countries to expand its empire, as in Legalism. They 
are trying to expand their government, just not necessarily through war: they have been 
trying to reintegrate Taiwan ever since it split. They also were successful in taking back 
Hong Kong in 1997. For areas that are not ethnically Chinese, it seems that economic 
domination is enough.  
 Thus the PRC seems to combine Confucian and Legalist principles in terms of 
military power. The military is a big part of the government (Legalism) but only towards 
its own people (also somewhat Legalist, but not Confucian). In terms of foreign policy, 
the PRC tends to focus on aspects other than war, like through economic domination 
(Confucianism—the not focusing on war part). However, since the economy is run by 
the military, it could be argued that the military influences foreign policy. Yet since this is 
not actual war, which is what Legalism requires, we are back to the idea that it is 
partially Confucian in terms of foreign policy but Legalist in terms of domestic policy. 
Discipline 
 Legalism necessitates clear and consistent, harsh punishments to enforce strict 
laws—not necessarily in accordance with the crime. It also calls for rewards for 
adherents. In contrast, Confucius in the Analects says, “If you govern the people 
                                                 
56 Hunter and Sexton 133. 
57 Ibid. 101. 
Tompkins 31 
 
legalistically and control them by punishment, they will avoid crime, but have no 
personal sense of shame. If you govern them by means of virtue and control them with 
propriety, they will gain their own sense of shame, and thus correct themselves.”58 As 
the first part of the Han dynasty testifies, the Confucian method of punishment cannot 
work by itself, since the Han dynasty adopted Legalist principles in order to call for order 
to the land. The shame is just not enough to keep from discord. The PRC today leans 
towards the Legalist spectrum, and Amnesty International reports that “The vast majority 
of executions [in Asia, which had the most in the world] were carried out in China,”59 
and report that China had more than a thousand executions in 2009 alone.60 Capital 
punishment is not just for murders; minor thefts can lead to execution.61 According to 
Hunter and Sexton, courts do not try hard to defend the accused: “their role is mainly to 
persuade the defendant to plead guilty, and to request a lenient sentence on the 
grounds of good character.”62 Recently, the capital punishment laws were reviewed, 
and 13 of 68 will be removed from the list. They all pertain to the economy and “They 
include tax fraud, the smuggling of cultural relics or precious metals, tomb robbing and 
stealing fossils.”63 Amnesty International claims that they are not used much anymore 
and were only conceded to look as if they are making headway on human rights. 
Similarly, prison labor camps were common under Mao, but have supposedly become 
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utilized less.64 The ones that still exist are concealed by the government and in bad 
conditions. This can be seen as similar to a person getting sent to the Great Wall or Shih 
Huangdi’s tomb to work for the rest of his life. 
 The methods of enforcing Chinese laws are harsh. In 2008 melamine was found in 
milk formulas for infants; melamine is usually used in concrete, plastic, and fertilizers, but 
in this case was used for protein. The catastrophe proved embarrassing for China, who 
punished those involved severely. 300,000 babies became sick from the milk, and at 
least six died. One man, Zhao Lianhai (whose own child became sick from the milk), 
created a website to inform parents about the situation. He advocated compensation, 
and was sentenced to incarceration for two and a half years because of the “social 
disorder” he caused. His lawyer has stated that "The crimes he was accused of were 
nothing more than what regular citizens would do to defend their rights.” 65  But the CCP 
has the habit of punishing those whose opinions differ from party line for causing this 
“social disorder.” It is a common theme, and also happened to Liu Xianbin—an activist 
who writes articles calling for democracy in China.66 He was recently sentenced to ten 
years in jail for his articles—but this is not the first time he has served time for going 
against the CCP.67 His wife was at the trial, and reportedly said, “Today I saw how legal 
tools were used to convict someone who is not guilty.”68 Thus there is alleged corruption 
in the courts to target those the CCP deems subversive.  
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 Ai Weiwei is a Chinese artist who has spoken up for human rights in the country. 
He had plans to open a new art building, which had originally been approved. It was 
then declared that the building was illegal and it had to be destroyed. Weiwei had 
planned to throw a party for the destruction, but men came and put him under house 
arrest. “’I'm under house arrest to prevent me from going to Shanghai. You can never 
really argue with this government,’ Mr Ai told the Associated Press by telephone.”69 
Again, the CCP punished someone for trying to point out an injustice in the 
government. 
 The CCP is also strict with its one child policy, enacted in efforts to control 
population. It seems that the CCP is trying to punish violators in new ways. “Family-
planning officials in the southern county of Puning, in Guangdong province, were going 
to shocking new extremes to catch and punish violators of the country’s infamous one-
child policy: They were seizing family members of women who had given birth illegally 
and were holding them hostage… [to] coerce the women into submitting to 
sterilization.”70 Haworth claims that this is to appeal to the Chinese sense of duty to 
family (which will be discussed momentarily). The relatives are held in poor conditions to 
guilt the violators into submitting themselves for sterilization. One woman interviewed 
said she had to be sterilized but under unsanitary and unsafe conditions while others 
were being sterilized in the same room. This supposedly happened during spring of 2010 
during an “Iron Fist Campaign” that was mentioned on local Chinese television, but 
nowhere else.  
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 It seems that in the PRC, their stance on punishment is Legalist with minimal—if at 
all—Confucian influence because the CCP does not trust others to shame themselves 
into acting “correctly.” Hunter and Sexton claim that Chinese like having a tough 
stance on crime on average,71 but where should it stop? How much discipline is enough 
to punish a crime? Also according to Hunter and Sexton, the government is trying to fix 
its police force to make it into an actual police force instead of ideology watchers.72 
However, it is important to note that this was where the first part of the Han dynasty was 
weak, because it trusted people to act right on their own. Thus the fact that 
Confucianism does not play much of a role in punishment in the PRC today does not 
mean that it was disregarded—other dynasties after the Han as well as the PRC knew 
that it was a weak part in Confucian rule, and that punishments had to be given in 
order to keep peace. 
Religion 
 Shih Huangdi was clearly against religions, and Confucianism is not concerned 
with religions, but the PRC has an interesting stance. It is officially atheist according to 
the CIA World Factbook but allows for some state-approved religions (this rule is a little 
more lax in the south, since it is harder to control in the rural areas). The legal religions 
can be approved if they are not rebellious to the state or the work of foreign powers 
trying to infiltrate China.73 “[W]hile the new guidelines [instituted in 1982 about “religious 
freedom”] tolerated religion, they also stated that believers would b closely supervised 
and that activities falling outside defined limits would be quashed.”74 Thus there is only a 
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minimal acceptance of religion, which could be too critical of the state to allow it to be 
free. 
Buddhism and Daoism are the most dominant forms of religion in China, but 
there are also Christians and Muslims. Hunter and Sexton say, “Chinese religion tended 
to be centered on the family and the local community.”75 Thus religion is not for the 
most part mass-organized like many Western religions; people keep it to themselves and 
their family. This goes against the CCP, since the CCP should be more important. This 
was more the case under Mao, which is partly why he allowed for religious persecution 
and incarceration. It is important to note that Mao himself turned into a demi-god while 
in power; his portrait was everywhere, people bowed to his image while confessing, 
and everyone carried the Little Red Book of his sayings. This was acceptable, though, 
because it was useful to the state. 
Though there is a connection between Legalist intolerance of religions and the 
PRC’s, it cannot be said that they definitely have a cause and effect relationship. The 
nature of a dictatorship requires complete loyalty to the state instead of to another 
higher being. However, if Legalism truly became ingrained into the Chinese culture and 
government-framework, it is definitely possible that the Legalist principles made it likelier 
that the state would dismiss religions.  
Society and Hierarchy 
 Society in the PRC today seems strictly Confucian. The family is the basis of life, 
and their culture is based on the Confucian ideals of respect and love. Because of this, 
it is a male-dominated society, especially in rural areas. When there were communes 
under Mao, the gender problems relaxed a little; as the communes have been 
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disregarded, men have taken the reigns again—along with age-old traditions.76 Hunter 
and Sexton describe it as Westernized but with certain traditional values emphasized. 
They also say it is traditional, but the traditions do not have to be that old. They go on to 
say, “The mass entry of women into the workforce in the Maoist period, the one-child 
policy and other factors have transformed many customs and attitudes at family 
level.”77 Regardless, women become part of their husband’s family upon marriage and 
a big extended family is ideal. These traditions have been around for centuries. It is 
specifically Confucian for the females to become part of their husband’s family and 
that women do not have their own reputation. Similarly, family and filial piety is still 
strong: one woman interviewed in Haworth’s article says, “’Children mean happiness to 
people here. The bigger your family, the greater your joy. It’s as simple as that.’”78 
Hunter and Sexton agree: “Throughout most of traditional China, and until very recently, 
family and kinship structures formed the most powerful network of authority over the 
individual.”79 They also describe family as having an “unusually unbreakable bond.”80 
These examples are because of the strong Confucian culture. Legalism does not seem 
to have much of a cultural influence, since the state is not as important. Yet the CCP 
does not want this to be the case. In this way, they have enacted multiple laws that 
target the idea of family as most important; it seems that this is in efforts to heighten the 
importance of the state. For example, having a one-child limit not only helps with 
population control, but also forces a new kind of family to emerge, one that is not as 
big. By restructuring the family, it allows people (especially women) to focus on careers 
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instead—which help the PRC in expanding its influence on the world. Thus the PRC 
seems to be enacting laws to make the Legalist values supersede the Confucian ones. 
After multiple generations, there is a good chance that the notion of family will be 
redefined.  
 Confucianism has a stranglehold on social hierarchy as well. Confucianism 
stresses respect between the lower and higher subjects of all relationships: 
student/teacher, subject/ruler, children/parents, wife/husband. This is still true today 
(though feminism is becoming more prominent, especially in urban areas. Arranged 
marriages are no longer required, the Land Law of 1950 allowed women to own and 
inherit property, they have access to education and jobs, and the One-Child Policy 
allows them to have careers).81 Because of this, “saving face” is important. Chinese can 
be passive-aggressive in order to not seem impolite and to keep their position in the 
hierarchy. Hunter and Sexton claim reputation is more important than money in China.82 
Legalism requires devotion and silence from its subjects, which may have influenced 
Chinese culture over the years, and perhaps encouraged or supported the Confucian 
need for it. 
 
Conclusion 
 It is impossible to show exactly how China has come to be the way it is. So many 
factors have contributed to its culture, government, etc. However, by focusing on two 
concepts (Confucianism and Legalism) it is possible to slightly understand how China 
has evolved into its current state. Confucianism and Legalism somehow blend together 
to create a powerful, centralized land, rich with culture. Its government has many 
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Legalist principles but Confucian as well. In regards to its military, it blends Confucian 
attitude towards war in foreign policy while keeping Legalist points in regards to its 
domestic policy. Legalism continues to influence discipline, but only because the 
Confucian stance proved ineffective. Religious indifference by the government could 
come from Confucianism, but the close watch of religions comes from Legalist 
paranoia. Finally, it seems that the CCP attempts to inject Legalism into the Confucian 
society in order to gain more respect for the state. These are important findings 
because it shows the impact that the past has on the present. This shows how human 
thought through time is not so different, and begs the question: does our way of 
thinking ever evolve? Or do we simply recycle ideas other people have come up with 
years ago or miles away?  
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